What Police Need to Know at the Polls

In advance of Election Day, law enforcement leaders and agencies should:

• Work with local election officials to establish operations centers or hotlines staffed by law enforcement, election officials, and county or municipal attorneys working collaboratively to provide guidance to those in the field.
• Engage community leaders and stakeholders throughout the voting period to develop plans for protecting public safety and the right to vote in ways best suited to the needs of the community.
  • In some communities, law enforcement presence at or near the polls may be prohibited by state law unless requested by election officials.
  • Even where not prohibited, law enforcement presence at or near polling places may itself be intimidating for some voters.
  • Meeting with stakeholders in advance and throughout the election and ballot-counting period can facilitate trust, transparency, and information-sharing about ongoing needs in both directions.
• Get familiar with key election laws, including laws on voter intimidation, poll observers, ballot challenging, and no-electioneering zones.
• Provide clear directives and advance briefing to line officers about the law and appropriate responses.

Voter intimidation, which is unlawful in every state and under federal law, includes conduct intended to cause a voter to change their vote, or not vote at all, by instilling fear.^{1See e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 245(b)(1)(A), 594; 52 U.S.C. § 20511(1); 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 3547 (West 2025); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1013 (West 2025); see also Inst. for Const. Advoc. & Prot., Fact Sheet: Protecting Against Voter Intimidation https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2024/08/Voter-Intimidation-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited July 13, 2026).} Voter intimidation is unlawful both inside and outside of any no-electioneering zone. Examples of voter intimidation may include:

• Verbal threats of violence
• Confronting voters while wearing military-style or official-looking uniforms
• Brandishing or intimidating display of firearms
• Disrupting voting lines or blocking entrances
• Spreading false information about voter fraud, requirements to vote, or penalties
• Aggressively approaching voters’ cars or writing down license plate numbers
• Following and/or recording voters to, from, or within polling places
• Directly and aggressively challenging voters’ qualifications
• Surveilling or photographing voters at ballot drop boxes, especially while armed
• Appearing to patrol or police the voting line while armed

Officers and election officials are empowered to maintain order and fairly enforce election laws.

• Most states prohibit electioneering in the immediate vicinity of polling places. Prohibited electioneering includes encouraging voters to vote a certain way, passing out leaflets, waving candidate flags, wearing clothing that conveys support for or opposition to a candidate or an issue on the ballot, and other political activities near polling places when voting is taking place.^{2See Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., Electioneering Prohibitions Near Polling Places (updated June 15, 2026), https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/electioneering-prohibitions.}
• State law defines who may act as a “poll observer,” “poll watcher,” or “election observer,” and whether such an observer or watcher may challenge a prospective voter’s eligibility at the polls and the procedures for doing so.^{3See Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Cortés, 218 F. Supp. 3d 396, 414 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (state law controls poll watchers); Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 385 (Pa. 2020) (same); see also Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., Poll Watchers & Voter Challenges (updated June 9, 2025), https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watchers-and-challengers (survey of relevant state laws).}
• Law enforcement officers should be familiar with state and local laws related to carrying firearms (concealed or open-carry) in or around polling places.^{4In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, the Supreme Court affirmed that in historically sensitive places, “arms carrying could be prohibited consistent with the Second Amendment,” and it specifically named “polling places” as one of these sensitive places. 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2133 (2022). See also Antonyuk v. Chiumento, 89 F.4th 271, 303-304 (2d Cir. 2023) (discussing Bruen’s reference to polling places in an opinion that generally upheld a New York law restricting the carrying of concealed weapons in “sensitive locations” including polling places, although this provision was not contested at the Circuit Court), cert. granted, vacated sub nom., Antonyuk v. James, 144 S. Ct. 2709 (2024) (mem.), reaff’d in part, Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1900 (2025); United States v. Allam, 677 F. Supp. 3d 545, 576 (E.D. Tex. 2023) (“Since this Nation’s Founding, polling places have often been viewed as sensitive places. . . . The purpose of the restriction was plainly stated: ‘To prevent any violence or force being used at the said elections.’”).}

Across all situations, police officers at or near polling places should use strategies, tactics, and communications approaches grounded in de-escalation.

Law enforcement should not be highly visible at the polls unless called to assist. Police should avoid being highly visible at polling locations unless they are responding to a specific, concrete issue. Law enforcement at the polls could be perceived as intimidating, particularly given the history of police authority being misused to promote, rather than prevent, voter intimidation. Indeed, many states have laws that restrict law enforcement officials from policing polling centers because of the potential that their presence will intimidate and deter voters.^{5The Brennan Center for Justice has identified some of these legal restrictions. See Eliza Sweren-Becker and Jasleen Singh, Guide to Laws Against Intimidation of Voters and Election Workers, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (June 18, 2024), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-laws-against-intimidation-voters-and-election-workers.}

If armed individuals or groups are near polling places: Law enforcement may open consensual lines of communication with the armed individuals/groups, without probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime is or may be underway, to understand: (1) who they are, (2) who they are affiliated with, and (3) what their purpose/goal is.

• Law enforcement may ask individuals to identify themselves and/or who they are affiliated with so long as they do not require individuals to answer and do not detain the individuals.^{6I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, (1984) (“[I]nterrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.”); United States v. Tafuna, 5 F.4th 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2021) (“Officers—without any basis for suspecting criminal activity is afoot—may approach an individual, ask a few questions, [and] ask to examine the individual’s identification.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).} Officers may then check databases to determine whether the identified armed person is prohibited from possessing a gun.
• Note that in many states it is illegal to give an officer a false name. Providing false identification in these states would itself allow an officer to detain the person to investigate their true identity.
• Law enforcement may approach an armed individual or group at or near a polling place and ask: “Why are you here?”

Special considerations regarding firearms:

• Individuals must comply with weapons permit restrictions and other generally applicable laws at or near polling places, such as any location-specific restrictions on firearms (e.g., schools, public buildings, stadiums, federal lands/facilities) or any state prohibition on brandishing firearms or using firearms to intimidate.
• In open-carry states, the mere carrying of a holstered handgun in public, without other indications of an intent to intimidate voters, would not warrant a Terry stop, but it could be the basis for asking the person to identify themselves and what they are doing, as discussed above.
• If there is probable cause to believe that individuals or groups are violating any state criminal law or local ordinance, law enforcement may direct them to cease the activity, or may issue a citation or make an arrest, depending on state law. If there is only reasonable articulable suspicion to believe a violation has occurred, law enforcement should consider conducting a Terry stop to further investigate.

Law enforcement personnel have an array of tools that can help in these situations, while still protecting the First and Second Amendment rights of those involved. Law enforcement may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that are narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in preventing voter intimidation. So long as they are not applied in a manner that discriminates based on viewpoint or any other prohibited discriminatory basis (such as race, gender, ethnicity, disability), police may:

• Move individuals or groups who are shouting, chanting, or waving large banners further away from voters, but still within earshot.
• Request that openly armed groups of individuals consent to putting away their weapons or move further away from voters.
• Separate opposing groups and set up buffer zones between them,^{7Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1986).} so long as the police do not engage in prohibited discrimination.^{8For more information on tools that law enforcement can use to constitutionally regulate protest activity, including those at polling places, without infringing on constitutional rights, see Inst. for Const. Advoc. & Prot., Protests and Public Safety: A Guide for Cities & Citizens, https://constitutionalprotestguide.org/ (last visited July 13, 2026).}

If assembled individuals appear to be or represent that they are part of a “militia,” know that:

• Groups of armed individuals that engage in paramilitary activity or law enforcement functions without being called forth by a governor or the federal government and without reporting to any government authority are acting as unauthorized private militias.
• An unauthorized private militia that attempts to activate itself for duty, outside of the authority of the state or federal government, is illegal.
• The Second Amendment does not protect private militias. As the Supreme Court determined in 1886 and reiterated in 2008, the Second Amendment “does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations.”^{9Heller, 554 U.S. at 621 (citing Presser, 116 U.S. 252 (1886)).}
• All 50 states prohibit private, unauthorized militias from engaging in military or law enforcement activities. ICAP has produced fact sheets containing state laws banning private unauthorized paramilitary activity, which are available at https://bit.ly/50factsheets, and which contain a checklist for assessing whether a group may be engaging in unlawful paramilitary activity.^{10For more information on state law prohibitions on private paramilitary activity, see Inst. for Const. Advoc. & Prot., Prohibiting Private Armies at Public Rallies: A Catalog of Relevant State and Statutory Provisions (4th ed., Jan. 2024), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2024/02/50-state-survey-v4-FIN.pdf.}

This fact sheet was prepared jointly by the States United Democracy Center, the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection (ICAP) at Georgetown University Law Center, and 21st Century Policing Solutions (21CP Solutions).

States United is a nonpartisan 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to the rule of law and free, fair, secure elections. We provide direct support to state officials and law enforcement leaders as they uphold the law and our system of checks and balances, protect public safety, defend elections, and preserve our democracy. For more information, visit statesunited.org.

ICAP’s mission is to use litigation, policy, and public education to protect constitutional rights, while working to hold our governmental institutions to the highest standards of integrity and accountability. Visit us at law.georgetown.edu/icap or contact us at reachICAP@georgetown.edu.

21CP Solutions is a team of forward-thinking thought leaders on public safety that helps cities and communities tackle the challenges of delivering safe, effective, just, and constitutional public safety services. Learn more at 21cpsolutions.com.